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 As smartphones have gained popularity over recent years, they have provided users 
convenient access to services and integrated sensors that were previously only available through 
larger, stationary computing devices.  This trend of ubiquitous, mobile devices provides 
unparalleled convenience and productivity for users who wish to perform everyday actions such 
as taking photos, participating in social media, reading emails, or checking online banking 
transactions.  However, the increasing use of mobile devices in public spaces by users has 
negative implications for their own privacy and, in some cases, that of bystanders around them.    
Specifically, digital photography trends in public have negative implications for 
bystanders who can be captured inadvertently in users’ photos.  Those who are captured often 
have no knowledge of being photographed and have no control over how photos of them are 
distributed.  To address this growing issue, a novel system is proposed for protecting the privacy 
of bystanders captured in public photos.  A fully automated approach to accurately distinguish 
the intended subjects from strangers is explored.  A feature-based classification scheme utilizing 
entire photos is presented.  Additionally, the privacy-minded case of only utilizing local face 
images with no contextual information from the original image is explored with a convolutional 
neural network-based classifier. Three methods of face anonymization are implemented and 
compared: black boxing, Gaussian blurring, and pose-tolerant face swapping. To validate these 
methods, a comprehensive user survey is conducted to understand the difference in viability 
between them. 
Beyond photographing, the privacy of mobile device users can sometimes be impacted in 
public spaces, as visual eavesdropping or “shoulder surfing” attacks on device screens become 
feasible. Malicious individuals can easily glean personal data from smartphone and mobile 
device screens while they are accessed visually.  In order to protect displayed user content, a 
novel, sensor-based visual eavesdropping detection scheme using integrated device cameras is 
proposed.  In order to selectively obfuscate private content while an attacker is nearby, a 
dynamic scheme for detecting and hiding private content is also developed utilizing User-
Interface-as-an-Image (UIaaI).  A deep, convolutional object detection network is trained and 
utilized to identify sensitive content under this scheme. To allow users to customize the types of 
content to hide, dynamic training sample generation is introduced to retrain the content detection 
network with very few original UI samples.  Web applications are also considered with a 
Chrome browser extension which automates the detection and obfuscation of sensitive web page 
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1 – Introduction 
 Due to the rapid increase in popularity of smartphones and mobile devices such as tablets 
and smart watches, their use has consequently risen among consumers in public spaces.  
Although this trend offers unparalleled levels of convenience for users, there are negative 
consequences for the privacy of individuals in public.  Two main privacy concerns are identified 
for mobile device users and bystanders alike: the increase of digital photography in public 
causing bystanders to be inadvertently captured and the potential for visual information leakage 
by eavesdroppers maliciously looking at device screens while they are in use by unaware users.  
In order to provide solutions for these growing issues, this thesis presents approaches which 
attempt to solve the separate privacy concerns. 
Digital photography is an enormously growing trend among the general public spurred 
primarily by the prevalence of smartphones with cameras in the daily lives of users.  Attempts at 
estimating the number of digital photos captured annually have shown significant increases year 
over year with no sign of slowing down. In 2016, 660 billion photos were estimated to have been 
captured which increased to 1.2 trillion by 2017. Additionally, smartphones were estimated to be 
primarily responsible for these photos, as they captured roughly 85% of the photos taken. Digital 
cameras, the next largest device group, made up only 10.3% by comparison [1]. This significant 
increase in digital photography demonstrates that people are more likely to be taking photos 
across many scenarios, including in public locations where oftentimes other people are nearby. 
Due to the crowded nature of public locations, strangers are frequently included in personal 
photos by circumstance. Fig. 1 provides an example of such an image taken in public including 
both a target person and strangers.  These strangers, or bystanders, often are completely unaware 
of photos being taken of them. Even realizing that a photo was taken, individuals usually have 
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very little recourse to ask to be removed from the photo or have the photo deleted in a public 
setting. 
To address these issues caused by smartphone photography, Chapter 2 details and evaluates a 
solution for the privacy impacts caused by digital photography in public places [cite your 
workshop paper and conference paper here].  An automated solution for distinguishing 
bystanders from subjects in photos is explored.  Additionally, several different methods for 
automatically obfuscating bystander faces caught in photos are explored.  Specifically, black 
boxing, blurring, and dynamic face swapping are implemented and evaluated in terms of 
potential privacy protection and visual impact on photo quality.  A user study is carried out with 
over 80 respondents to further evaluate the approach and ensure that the privacy concerns 
generated from public photography are a valid concern among users. 
Similar to increasing digital photography trends, smartphones and mobile devices such as 
tablets, smart watches, etc. have rapidly grown in popularity in recent years.  These types of 
devices offer unparalleled convenience and ease of access for end users who increasingly need to 
be able to access applications and services on the go.  Estimates of smartphone sales trends have 
shown that the market has rapidly grown since the early 2000s.  In 2019 alone, smartphone 
manufacturers sold an estimated 1.5 billion devices [2].  This is an enormous increase over 
estimates in 2007 which place sales at only 122 million units [3].  With this saturation of mobile 
devices among consumers, usage has likewise increased rapidly in public spaces. 
Due to the convenience of having access to emails, text messages, and other applications, 
individuals frequently utilize devices in scenarios such as eating, riding a subway, or while 
walking where others behind or to the side of a user can easily see or visually eavesdrop the 
content on their device screens.  This clearly constitutes a security risk, as a majority of users are 
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likely to access sensitive apps in public [4] such as text or productivity.  Users accessing their 
smartphones generally have no way of easily knowing if an attacker is spying on their screen. 
 Chapter 3 proposes a sensor-based scheme to provide smartphone users with a means to 
quickly and easily detect attackers attempting to glance at their phone screen.  A magnetometer 
binary thresholding method is utilized to filter out user faces while utilizing integrated front 
facing cameras to discretely scan around and behind the user to find potential attackers.  To 
allow users to still utilize apps while protecting sensitive content, user interface as an image 
(UIaaI) is proposed to pre-render UI views.  These pre-rendered views can be used to 
automatically detect private content to avoid the necessity of large code changes for complex 
applications.  Beyond mobile applications, a web browser extension is developed to obfuscate 
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2 – Automated Bystander Detection and Anonymization in Mobile Photography 
2.1 – Introduction 
With the rising popularity of mobile photography by consumers causing an unprecedented 
increase in photos taken in public spaces, bystanders are frequently caught unaware by user 
cameras.  To help mitigate the privacy concerns caused by this trend, this work explores 
solutions for bystander detection and studies effective ways to obfuscate bystander faces. To this 
end, both a feature-based classification approach utilizing entire photos and a privacy-minded, 
convolutional neural network (CNN)-based approach utilizing only local face images with no 
contextual information from the original photo are proposed to investigate how different models 
learn the intrinsic visual differences between targets and bystanders. In order to train and 
evaluate the models, a real-world dataset consisting of over 200 photos and over 500 faces has 
been created to provide a generalized representation of the types of images that commonly can 
be found uploaded to social media. Generally, the photos provide a mixture of both celebrities 
appearing in public with bystanders behind them and typical people in front of landmarks or 
other locations of interest with strangers also inadvertently captured in the photo.  
In addition to the classifiers, methods for effective facial obfuscation also are implemented 
and examined through a user study (with IRB approval) as a part of this work. The methods for 
anonymizing faces not only include standard methods such as Gaussian blurring and black 
boxing but also a novel approach of face swapping using a state-of-the-art position map 
regression network [2]. To gain a fuller understanding of how these obfuscation methods impact 
and are perceived by end users, an in-depth survey is carried out and evaluated to determine the 
preferred methods of actual users. General opinions on privacy as it relates to digital photos 
capturing strangers are also collected to validate the assumptions behind this work. 
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This work’s main contributions are summarized as follows: 
• An automated system for protecting bystander’s privacy in mobile photography with 
a unique feature that it can work as a standalone tool on a user’s smartphone, without 
relying on inter-user interaction or any online platforms which are commonly needed 
by previous solutions. 
• A novel, feature-based classification approach utilizing entire photos and a privacy-
minded CNN-based approach utilizing local face images for automatically 
distinguishing targets from bystanders in mobile photography. The two approaches 
are evaluated and compared to explore the tradeoff between the distinguishing 
accuracy and privacy. 
• The implementation of three face obfuscation methods for complete face 
anonymization including black boxing, blurring, and face swapping.  A user study is 
carried out with 89 respondents to evaluate opinions on bystander privacy and on the 
acceptability of the three face anonymization methods. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 2.2 provides an overview 
of related works. Chapter 2.3 presents an overview of the design for the system.  Chapter 2.4 
describes the feature-based approach for target/bystander classification.  Chapter 2.5 describes 
the convolutional neural network approach.  Chapter 2.6 provides evaluations of both models. 
Chapter 2.7 provides a technical description of proposed facial obfuscation methods and presents 
the results from the user survey.  Chapter 2.8 presents conclusions.  
2.2 – Related Works 
Works related to improving facial privacy in photography have previously followed 
trends such as utilizing photographer-bystander cooperation.  Li et al. [3,4] design systems for 
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cooperation between smartphone users to blur requesting users’ faces. Jung and Philipose [5] 
utilize a method of gesture recognition to detect a person who wants to be excluded from a 
photo. MarkIt [6] can perform automated covering of user-defined objects in photos, but users 
must manually predefine objects to be hidden. This work, by comparison, explores a fully 
automated approach towards the identification of bystanders to be obfuscated and requires no 
manual interaction from photographers or those captured in photos.  
Other approaches in automated anonymization require users interested in having their 
privacy protected to wear specialized markers. Schiff et al. [7] pro-pose a scheme whereby 
specialized markers that users wear can be recognized by an automated system which will then 
blur their faces. Bo et al. [8] similarly utilize worn QR-codes on clothing to automatically 
determine individual privacy preferences. Our approach does not require any worn markings; 
only visual at-tributes of persons within individual images are used to anonymize those who are 
inadvertently captured.  
Some works explore photo privacy protection for individuals in online social network 
settings [9, 10, 11] or in individual phones [12].  Li et al. proposed HideMe [10], a system for 
defining scenarios for photo access control and distance-based face blurring. Xu et al. [11] 
developed a facial identification system to incorporate captured persons into the decision process 
of sharing photos. Ilia et al. [9] proposed fine grained access control based on face detection to 
prevent individual faces from being viewed by other users. Each of these works depend upon 
either accurate facial recognition to identify bystanders for anonymizing or specific scenario 
definitions from the photographer.  This work circumvents the need for both face recognition and 
input from the photographer by automating the detection of bystanders and providing low-impact 
solutions for obfuscating their faces.  
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One recent work in parallel to this one also explores detection of bystanders utilizing 
features computed over individuals [13]. However, the features used in this work are different 
from theirs. Also, that work focuses entirely on feature engineering and effectiveness of 
predictive models, but this work presents a full system for both detecting and anonymizing 
bystanders and explores the trade-off between bystander protection and photo quality/usability. 
Additionally, privacy-aware machine learning is considered with the development of a CNN 
which does not require access to an entire user photo and can predict solely based on facial 
images.  While Hasan et al. [13] explore both transfer learning on deep neural networks, this 
approach utilizes a simplified feature-set which allows for simpler and smaller classifiers. 
Our preliminary work [14] introduced the computation of facial features including face 
size, face deviation, and gaze direction for distinguishing targets and bystanders.  However, that 
work only introduced basic methods of gathering these features and did not propose a full feature 
set.  The features proposed in this work expand upon the face size, deviation, and gaze concepts 
with a more accurate CE-CLM model and more explicitly define feature computations.  
Additionally, this work utilizes a full feature set to create a complete scheme for bystander 




Figure 1:  Example image with target clearly featured in the foreground and bystanders included 




2.3 – System Overview 
 The proposed system works on the photographing phone and consists of four main 
processes that can automatically run over taken photos.  The first is an initial pass of face 
detection which identifies face regions and positions.  This process of facial detection is fully 
automated and requires no manual user input specifying specific photos or regions to be focused 
by the algorithm. Facial region data from this pass can then be forwarded either to the feature-
based or CNN classifiers which automate the detection of targets and bystanders.  The 
classifications along with face landmarks are then used to perform obfuscation processing with 
the black boxing, blurring, and face swapping methods which can be selected by the user as a 
system configuration parameter.  The resulting anonymized photo is the final output. Fig. 2 
provides a visualization of this system. Both classifiers are robust against nonstandard scenarios 
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where a photo might not include any bystanders or any human targets (pictures of scenery are an 
example of this.) 
 
Figure 2: Architecture of the system. 
 
2.4 – Feature-Based Bystander Classifier 
2.4.1 – Feature Identification 
In order to begin designing a model for classification of an abstract concept such as who 
is the desired target of a photo, it is essential to correctly break the problem down into 
quantitative measurements which provide a suitable amount of information to distinguish classes.  
Relative face size (the size of a given face relative to the maximum face size in the image) and 
face deviation from center are identified to model the fact that bystanders are often included in 
the background or periphery of photos.  Local blurriness of a face is also found to regularly 
indicate a person was not the intended focus of a picture.  Beyond these metrics of relative visual 
differences, additional features are identified to model the fact that bystanders are usually 
unaware of having their photo captured. Additionally, non-relative features are needed to account 
for scenarios where photos might exclude any human targets (for example bystanders are 
captured in an image of scenery or some other non-human target). Head pose angles and gaze 
deviation from the camera are decided as good indicators of this, as bystanders will commonly 
not be looking at the camera capturing them if they are unaware of it. Considering all of these 
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metrics in a single model, relative face size, face deviation from photo center, local blurring, 
head pose, and gaze deviation are identified as a sufficient number of features to capture the 
complexity of the target/bystander classification problem. 
2.4.2 – Feature Extraction and Computation 
Relative Face Size 
In order to accurately capture face size in an image, traditional bounding box methods 
used by most state-of-the-art object detection models such as YOLOv3 [15] are not sufficient. 
These bounding boxes normally have no guarantee of forming a tight bound on the object in 
question.  Instead, we recognize that recent advances in constrained local neural fields (CLNFs) 
for facial landmark detection are more suited for the task of robust landmark placement for 
photos taken in the wild due to their resistance to factors such as pose differences, lighting 
changes, and local facial differences such as hair or accessories.  To this end, we adopt a 
Convolutional Experts Constrained Local Model (CE-CLM) [16] [17] to perform accurate facial 
landmark placement.  These types of models function by first capturing landmark shape 
variations with a point distribution model (PDM) and then modeling the local differences in the 
visual appearances of fitted landmarks with the use of local patch experts.  This model, 
pretrained over LFPW [18] and Helen [19] training sets, is able to accurately determine 
landmark positions and provided higher detection rates on smaller faces as well as partially 




Figure 3: Standard template of facial landmarks fitted by common face detection networks. 
 
 
Fig. 3 provides a visualization of the standard collection of facial landmarks which are 
fitted by networks such as Dlib and the CE-CLM model.  Refer to this figure for locating any 
numbered facial landmarks mentioned subsequently.  Once a tight bound has been formed 




𝑆(𝑖) =  (𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(𝛾𝑖 − 𝛿𝑖) (1) 
where i refers to the index of the current face in the photo which can have n faces, αi is the x-
coordinate of facial landmark 16. βi is the x-coordinate of landmark 0, γi is the y-coordinate of 
landmark 24, and δi is the y-coordinate of landmark 8. The subscript i for each of these variables 
indicates that these are specific to the face with index i.  Similarly, the relative face size metric 







where si  is the size of face i and μ is the maximum face size computed in equation 1. Thus, the 
relative size of any given face will always fall within the bounds of (0,1]. 
Deviation of Face from Center 
Face position within an image can be extracted and computed in a method similar to the 
relative face size metric.  Facial landmarks are fitted to each detected face in an image with the 
center of the face treated as landmark 33.  By utilizing this landmark, it is possible to accurately 
extract what region of the image a given face is located assuming the dimensions of the image 
are known.  To create a useful metric for supervised learning models, the face position is 
computed as the amount of deviation from center of the image.  The intuition here is that the 
feature generally should (but not always) provide a positive correlation with the likelihood that a 
given face belongs to that of a stranger.  To better capture the meaning behind a person's face 
deviation from the center of a photo, the metric should be normalized such that its range of 
values carry the same meaning across different photo sizes.  To this end, the deviation of a 








Here, εi is the x-coordinate of landmark 30, ζ is the x-coordinate of the computed center 
of the image, ηi is the y-coordinate of landmark 30, θ is the y-coordinate of the center of the 
image, w is the width dimension of the image, and h is the height dimension of the image.  The 
subscript i, as in previous equations, refers to the i-th detected face in the image.  The deviation 
in both x and y coordinate axes is summed for this metric because their relative importance 
towards determining the likelihood of a person being a bystander in an image is unclear.  For 
example, consider a case where a target is featured centrally in front of public stairs, and a 
bystander is captured farther up the stairs in the image.  Although the bystander might be 
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centrally located in the x-axis, their y-axis deviation is more important in this case.  Because of 
this ambiguity in importance across image cases, both axis deviations are weighted the same 
when computing the overall deviation.  The bound of this metric then becomes [0,2]. 
Local Blurring 
Many methods exist to compute the amount of blurring that occurs over a localized 
region in an image.  One of the most popular methods is to compute a Fast Fourier Transform 
over an image to break it down into its constituent frequencies and perform frequency domain 
analysis on the results.  This method is not ideal for generating a general metric of blurriness 
across photos as it is difficult to identify the specific frequencies in the general case which mark 
a region as blurry vs. another.  Instead, the convolution of the Laplacian method proposed by 
Pech-Pacheco et al. [21] is selected for its ability to provide average edge variance in an image as 
a single floating-point result.  This is desirable from a feature engineering perspective because 
blurriness, as a measure of edge variance, effectively captures the desired information from an 
image region without requiring a secondary classifier to convert frequency component 
information into a blurriness boolean. 
To perform this method, the Laplace operator which is defined in 2-dimensional 








However, in a discrete grid such as an image, the discrete Laplacian is used which 








This operation is therefore used to generate a floating point “rating" of the blurriness over 
each local region of detected faces defined by their bounding boxes extracted by padding the 
space around the outer facial landmarks.  Bounding boxes are used in this case rather than the 
tight bounds featured in previous features because the wider region around the face contains 
additional edges for the Laplacian convolution operation. This provides a better idea of how 
much variance is in the face's surrounding edges. 
Head Pose Estimation 
Head pose defines the way an individual's head is oriented in 3-dimensional space.  
Intuitively, being able to extract some measurements of head orientation should capture the trend 
of strangers having their heads turned away from a capturing camera.  To define head 
orientation, 3 main parameters are needed: 
• Pitch: This defines the angle a head is looking up or down.  Essentially a measure 
of vertical tilt. 
• Roll: The angle a head is tilted from side to side.  Note that this is distinct from 
yaw in that roll can vary while the face remains looking forward. 
• Yaw: The angle a head is turned from left to right.  For example, when turning to 
look at something behind a person, the head yaw angle becomes more extreme. 
 
Each of these angles are intrinsically within the CE-CLM models as they internally keep 
a 3D representation of the fitted face landmarks.  These 3D representations can be utilized to 
estimate accurate head pose information by solving the n-point in perspective problem [16] [17] 
[22].  This procedure essentially allows for accurate estimation of head pose angles in general 
16 
 
images.  These angles are represented as continuous floating-point values which can range both 
in positive and negative directions. 
Gaze Deviation 
This feature is intended to provide additional information about whether a given person 
has awareness of being included in a photograph.  Although head pose angles can provide 
information whether the face in question is oriented toward the camera, these angles do not tell 
the whole story.  A stranger in a photo could very well have their head oriented toward the 
camera if, for example, they are walking behind someone taking a selfie. To provide more 
information to learning models about these situations, gaze deviation from the center of the 
camera focus could be included. 
In order to extract gaze angles, a slightly altered method of utilizing CLNFs proposed by 
[23] is adopted.  In the original work, CLNFs were utilized to form a PDM of the eye landmarks 
for synthesized eyes. This estimation of the shape of the eye can then be used to further estimate 
what direction the eye is oriented in (and where the eye is looking). The accuracy of the gaze 
estimation was improved utilizing pre-determined intrinsic camera parameters.  However, 
because photos captured by mobile devices in the wild provide no information about these 
parameters, we adopt the model to utilize some default values for these camera parameters.  
These include estimated distance of the face from the camera, focal length, and optical center.  
This sort of calibration cannot be done for images collected for the training dataset as there 
simply are too many camera-to-person-positionings to take into account.  Therefore, the gaze 
vectors should be considered rough estimates of whether a given person is looking in the general 
direction of a camera.  The rationale behind this is that a binary value of looking vs. not looking 
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at a camera is still a desirable trait in identifying bystanders in a mobile photo. Example gaze 
vectors plotted over an image can be seen in Fig. 4. 
By utilizing extracted gaze vectors, it is possible to trace a ray from the center of a given 
face into the estimated camera location.  Then, by organizing world coordinates with the camera 
at the origin (0,0,0), it is possible to estimate the position of a face from the camera using 
coordinates.  The tracing process begins by setting up the following equation: 
κ𝑧 + 𝑢λ⃗ 𝑧 = 0 (6) 
Here κz refers to the z-coordinate or estimated depth of facial landmark 30, u is a scaling 
factor which must satisfy the equation, and 𝜆𝑧⃗⃗  ⃗ is the z-coordinate vector of the average gaze 
angle for a given face.  Solving this equation for scaling factor u allows us to then scale the other 
components of the full gaze vector 𝜆 : 





To compute the point ρ where the ray traced from the face intercepts with the origin or 
camera z-plane, the scaled gaze vector must be added to κ (landmark 30): 
𝜌 = 𝜅 + 𝜆 ′ (8) 
The value of ρ enables a deviation estimate for anyone looking in the direction of the 
camera's z-plane.  Using the x and y components of ρ, and assuming the camera is the origin of 
the world coordinates, we can use a simple 2-D distance formula calculation to find the final 
deviation: 




The resulting value of D computed for any given detected face is the final metric for a 
supervised learning model.    
 
Figure 4: Gaze vectors from the CLNF model in green with face landmarks from the CE-CLM 
model on an example image with no bystanders.  Original image by Steve Granitz, WireImage. 
 
2.4.3 – Supervised Learning Model Consideration 
Because all of the facial features are collectively designed to fully capture the complexity 
of the bystander classification problem, they should generalize very well to a wide range of 
supervised learning models.  In this implementation, a collection of diverse classifiers are 
implemented and evaluated, including Gradient Boosted Decision Tree, Multilayer Perceptron, 
Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine.  Detailed descriptions of these algorithms as well 




2.5 – CNN-Based Bystander Classifier 
2.5.1 – Network Architecture 
Fig. 5 provides an overview of the complete network architecture. The network utilizes 
increasingly small convolutions separated by max pooling layers.  The activation functions 
utilized by the network are rectified linear unit (Relu) for the two convolutional layers and 
sigmoid for the final activation layer. The dense layers in the latter portion of the model are 
intended to produce meaning from the large feature vector and condense them into more usable, 
countable features.  The final dropout layer is included to reduce overfitting on the training set.  
It is set to drop inputs at a rate of 0.25 which experimentally achieved best results.  The filter size 
of the convolutional layers is small, at a size of (2,2).  This is to ensure that fine-detailed features 
such as eye direction might be captured, as eyes in the facial dataset can sometimes be very small 
(only being formed from a few 10s of pixels).  Stride for each of these kernels is set to (1,1), 
such that a direct sweep of the kernel is performed over the image. 
 
Figure 5: Overall architecture of the convolutional neural network. 
 
2.6 – Model Evaluation 
2.6.1 – Dataset 
The dataset for this problem was created specifically for this project due to the fact that 
no existing datasets could be found at the time which provided the types of required images.  The 
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images in the set were automatically collected from freely available online sources including 
social media platforms, public news sites, and image repository sites.  Collected photos were 
manually reviewed to ensure the dataset would be able to provide a good generalization of the 
types of images that might be encountered in the wild.  To be included, photos were required to 
have at least one human face.  Photos could have all targets, all bystanders, or a mixture of both.  
The photos are all taken in various settings including indoor/outdoor locations, public venues 
with varying degrees of crowding, and daytime/nighttime lighting conditions.  Photos excluding 
human targets such as scenery photos were also included to ensure the developed models could 
generalize to these challenging scenarios.  In total, the dataset consists of 515 valid face images 
extracted from 222 photos. It is worth noting that our dataset is of comparable size to Hassan et 
al. [13] (515 facial images vs 600).  In order to allow other researchers to utilize these images 
and contribute new images, we have made the dataset publicly available at [24]. 
2.6.2 – Feature-Based Bystander Classification 
Model Selection and Implementation 
The following supervised learning algorithms were selected and implemented to provide 
a good coverage of the varieties of popular classifiers and demonstrate that even with multiple 
different algorithms, our features generalize well. 
Gradient Boosted Decision Tree (GBDT) 
GBDTs are an enhancement over normal decision trees whereby an ensemble of weaker 
models are utilized to form a single classifier [25].  The number of estimators or trees used was 
300.  A maximum depth of 10 was also selected for the classifier.  The learning rate was set to 




Random Forest (RF) 
Instead of the weak models favored by gradient boosting methods, the RF approach is to 
make use of deep, fully grown trees and average them together to reduce variance and overfitting 
[26].  The RF algorithm was selected to offer a good comparison with GBDTs.  The number of 
estimators for this algorithm was selected as 50 with a max depth of 6. 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
Because SVMs are considered very suitable for binary classification [27], they were 
chosen for evaluation alongside other more advanced algorithms.  Best results were achieved 
with a linear kernel, with hyperparameter C set to 10 and gamma set to 0.001. 
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 
Neural networks are a logical choice for a feature-based model such as this.  The chosen 
architecture for the MLP is 3 hidden layers of size (7,5,3).  The hyperbolic tangent function was 
selected for activation, and a learning rate of 0.03 is used with alpha parameter set to 0.0001.  
After multiple training attempts, this coupling of architecture and hyperparameter values 
provided best results. 
Training and Evaluation 
Each of the feature-based algorithms was trained over a random 80/20 train/test sample 
split of 515 feature sets (one set for each face image in the dataset).  Validation metrics are 
shown in Table 1.  Of the classifiers we trained, the GDBT and MLP neural network were able to 
achieve the best validation accuracy at 94.34%.  The RF and SVM were still able to achieve 
acceptable accuracy over 90%.  The reasoning for this is that the simpler SVM model had a 
higher tendency to overfit the training set and resulted in less generalizable models.  The RF 
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model suffered from the lower depth of underlying decision trees relative to the GBDT but 
required less processing to perform prediction passes. 
Different classifiers were able to predict targets and bystanders with varying degrees of 
effectiveness.  This is shown by the precision, recall, and F-1 score of each algorithm.  Precision 
is defined as the number of true positives out of the combined number of true positives and false 
positives.  Recall is defined as the number of true positives out of the combined number of true 
positives and false negatives.  F1-score is the harmonic mean of the two.  The MLP actually had 
the overall highest F1 scores with 0.93 (target positive) and 0.94 (bystander positive).  The 
GDBT suffered from significantly worse precision when predicting targets which indicates that it 
might have difficulty identifying relevant targets in the wild.  It achieved the same target F1 
score as the SVM model which had the lowest scores for both targets and bystander prediction. 
In order to determine how effective each of the engineered features was individually to 
the classifiers, the algorithms were trained over different subsets of the complete feature-set.  
Each subset had one feature removed and the others included.  Table 2 lists the validation 
accuracies for these models.  Of the features tested for exclusion from the models, the gaze 
deviation metric, when removed, had no real impact on the performance of the GBDT and only a 
small impact to the other models.  By contrast, both the face size and center deviation metrics 
had significant harmful impacts on all of the classifiers.  This could be an indication that the 
inherent inaccuracy of the gaze metric itself was a problem for training.  Additionally, the gaze 
metric could simply be redundant where head pose information might have been sufficient.  For 
these reasons, the gaze deviation metric could be a candidate for removal in the interest of 
improving training and prediction speed.  Table 3 shows the measured single forward-pass 
runtimes for each of the examined classifiers averaged over 1000 runs.  All feature-based 
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classifiers have almost negligible runtime requirements for prediction operations on an Intel i9 
platform.  This indicates they would be excellent candidates to run directly on resource-
constrained mobile devices.  Because of the streamlined set of features used by the classifier, the 
computational complexity of all classifiers was kept low and should be suitable for direct 
implementation on resource constrained mobile devices. 
 
Table 1: Accuracy, precision, and recall metrics for all classifier models. (T) and (B) indicate 
that the metric was computed with target or bystander respectively as the positive class. 
 
 
Table 2: Validation accuracy for models trained using feature-subsets. 
 
 






2.6.3 – CNN-Based Bystander Classification 
In order to train the CNN, the same image set was used as for the feature-based model 
with a similar 80/20 train/test split.  However, extracted local face images were used rather than 
entire photos.  As mentioned previously, the goal of analyzing this network is to see if a privacy-
concerned model could function well without needing to process entire images.  Actual training 
took place utilizing mini-batch gradient descent with a batch size of 24 samples and 17 steps per 
epoch.  Through experimentation, it was found that the CNN training accuracy generally 
converged after 15 training epochs.  The testing accuracy was 81.55% with target precision and 
recall of 82.69% and 81.13% respectively which is significantly lower than the best feature-
based models.  Additionally, the predictive runtime of the model was found to be much higher 
than the feature-based models at around 244ms on an Intel i9 platform see (Table 3 for detailed 
runtime comparisons). However, these metrics are still impressive considering the loss of 
contextual information about a photo that the CNN experiences in comparison with the feature 
sets. 
Originally, it appeared as though the networks would quickly converge during training 
due to the relatively stable loss value that was reported for the first 10 training epochs.  However, 
by doubling the training epochs, it was found that true loss convergence did not generally happen 
until further training occurred.  Through multiple experiments, the number of epochs that 
resulted in the lowest loss without overfitting and harming test accuracy occurred with 15 as 
mentioned previously.  An example of a complete training sequence is provided in Fig. 6 with 
loss plotted.  Additionally, Figure 7 shows the accuracy of the CNN as mini-batches progress 
during training.  Taken in conjunction with Figure 6, the CNN appears to only converge after the 
220th mini-batch where loss and accuracy variance is lowest. 
25 
 
It is interesting to note that just three epochs were enough to provide significant 
improvements in loss and training accuracy, but, in experiments, the model was not able to 
effectively generalize to the test set after such short training periods.  It is also worth noting that 
with a training accuracy approaching 89% and test accuracy reaching 81.55%, overfitting still 
occurs in the model even with a reasonable dropout rate of 0.25. 
 
 






Figure 7: Progressive accuracy over training mini-batches for the CNN classifier. 
 
The main contribution of this model is the fact that, unlike the feature-based approach 
which will require users to supply entire images to compute contextual features such as relative 
face size, this model is still able to effectively distinguish bystanders and targets with only face 
images, as it convolves over a “cropped" facial region.  The hope is that users who might not 
want to supply entire photos to an automated system especially when the system is hosted in the 
cloud can still make use of a less invasive model which will not see any exposing information at 
the cost of a significant, flat decrease in performance in terms of accuracy, precision, and recall. 
2.7 – Anonymizing Bystander Faces 
For a complete system to ensure the privacy of strangers captured in images, it is 
necessary to automate the obfuscation of faces so that the ease of identifying someone is severely 
limited. Although there are some methods available to obfuscate faces, it is still unclear how 
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acceptable they are to users. In this section, we implement three different methods for facial 
anonymization and explore them with a user study.  Fig. 8 provides a visualization of each 
method on an example photo from the training dataset. 
 
Figure 8: From left to right: original image, image with black boxing, image with blurring, 
image with face swapping. Image source: 
https://cdn.ebaumsworld.com/2008/08/861915/phelps01.jpg 
 
2.7.1 – Implementation of Obfuscation Methods 
Black Boxing 
Black boxing of the face is the simplest, and arguably most secure method for facial 
anonymization.  The detected stranger face is completely removed from the image with every 
pixel RGB value being set to black.  In this way, there is not any remaining information which 
can be gleaned from the face, such as race or face size which the other proposed methods can 
leave behind.  Although this provides the strongest guarantee of privacy, the visual impact to a 
photo can be very harmful depending on the surrounding lighting conditions. 
Gaussian Blurring 
Blurring is considered an intermediary between the black boxing and face swapping 
methods in terms of intended impact to photo quality. Blurring on smaller faces can be relatively 
unnoticeable in images, especially on persons captured in the far background of an image.  
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Unlike black boxing, information such as race and even hair color can still be preserved 
depending on the resolution of the photo. However, facial features are always guaranteed to be 
completely anonymized. Gaussian blurring is used for this system due to its popularity and ease 
of computation.  A kernel size of (70,70) is used and achieves acceptable blurring. 
Face Swapping 
Pose-tolerant face swapping traditionally required the use of deep CNNs such as the 
deepfake project which requires specific training for the two faces attempting to be swapped.  
However, recent advances in automated swapping, specifically the introduction of position map 
regression networks, have allowed for excellent generalized swapping of 3D face masks without 
any need for targeted training.  Using an implementation of this method introduced by Feng et al. 
[2] allows for a novel technique of anonymizing bystander faces with any selection of “public" 
faces.  These public faces could be commonly known celebrities or even artificially generated 
portraits.  Assuming the face is realistic enough and lighting differences are not too extreme, the 
results can be very believable.  For this project, faces taken from stock photos found online were 
used.  To match skin tone for each detected stranger face, it is possible to compute an average 
pixel color value utilizing facial landmarks within the face region to gain a representation of their 
overall face color.  This color is then compared with the precomputed averages of a collection of 
public faces.  The public face which minimizes the difference is selected for swapping. 
2.7.2 – Survey of Users on Face Anonymization 
 
In order to validate our obfuscation methods and demonstrate that they are both effective 






To gain a better understanding of how actual users regard the protection of privacy for 
strangers and themselves in photos, one portion of the survey asked participants for their 
opinions on a series of questions relating to digital photo privacy and stranger protection.  These 
questions were presented as: 
• Question 1: Ensuring the privacy of digital photos is important. 
• Question 2: You would want your privacy protected if someone took a photo that 
captures you without you knowing. 
• Question 3: It is a good idea to protect strangers' privacy in your photos. 
• Question 4: It is sometimes hard to avoid including strangers' faces in photos 
taken in public places. 
• Question 5: If there was an option to protect a stranger's face in your photo 
without affecting quality, you would use it. 
• Question 6: If there was an option to protect a stranger's face in your photo while 
slightly degrading the quality, you would still use it. 
• Question 7: If there was an option to protect a stranger's face in your photo while 
significantly degrading the quality, you would still use it. 
Users were asked to rate their opinions to these questions on a Likert scale. 
 
Another portion of the survey presented an unaltered photo compared with anonymized 
photos where strangers' faces had been obfuscated using each of the three proposed methods.  
Participants were asked to rate their opinion on how harmful each method was to the original 
photo on a sliding scale from 0 to 10, with 0 in this case being not harmful and 10 being 
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extremely harmful.  In addition to rating the impact of each method on the photos, participants 
were also asked to rate their willingness to use each method on their own photos from 0 to 10.  
At the end of the section, participants could also optionally respond with testimonial as to which 
method they preferred and why. 
In another portion of the survey, participants were presented with timed views of images. 
One image had strangers anonymized with face swapping and the other did not. The participants 
had to guess if any face swapping occurred or not in each of the two. This portion of the survey 
was intended to examine how noticeable face swapping could be in a fast browsing environment 
such as social media where average users generally only spend a few seconds looking at pictures 
before moving on. 
Responses 
In total, the survey received 89 anonymous responses over the course of 1 month.  
Participants were primarily recruited among university students mainly majoring in computer 
science and computer engineering although a minority of respondents were working adults.  All 
respondents participated on a completely voluntary basis (no incentives were provided).  Exact 
demographic information was not collected to preserve participant anonymity.  Figure 9 shows 
detailed results of participant responses to survey questions 1-7.   
 In reviewing the responses to questions 1-7, it is clear that respondents had strong 
feelings in support of digital photo privacy. Most respondents likewise felt that both their privacy 
and stranger's privacy should ideally be protected in public photographs.  Additionally, a large 
majority of respondents answered positively that they would make use of an anonymization 
system, assuming the impact to the photo was negligible while a majority responded negatively 
to any sort of significant impact to photo quality.  Clearly, finding obfuscating methods with as 
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little impact as possible to photo quality is paramount in designing a system that would be well-
regarded and actually used. 
The results of the harmfulness ratings questions are shown in Fig. 10.  The results of the 
willingness ratings questions are shown in Fig. 11.  From these results, black boxing received the 
most negative feedback with a large majority of participants rating its impact the worst overall 
and usability the lowest.   Interestingly, blurring seemed to score the highest among respondents 
for both usability and harmfulness.  Face swapping had comparable harmfulness but was rated 
significantly lower on average for usability.  To further examine these results, some participant 
responses provide helpful insight.  Most participants who felt blurring was their preferred 
method seemed to find that face swapping was either unnatural looking or felt that they could not 
trust it to always create a believable swap.  For example, one user responded, “The black box 
hurt the quality of the photo and the swapping was disturbing because you could tell it was the 
wrong face on the stranger.".  Overall, it seemed that blurring would be the best approach from a 
usability and perceived impact perspective based on this participant feedback. 
Analyzing the number of users who were able to detect face swapping in the final survey 
section demonstrates that face swapping certainly is still detectable among many users despite 
recent advances in realistic swapping technology.  53.9% of respondents were able to tell that 
face swapping was used in the photo they were presented compared with 8% detection for the 
control photo.  Many users noticed that something was different about the photo compared with 






Figure 9: Survey responses to opinion questions 1-7. 
 
 




Figure 11: Survey responses to rating how willing users would be to use each anonymization 
method. 
 
2.8 – Conclusion 
In this work, we presented a novel approach for automating the detection and 
anonymization of bystanders in digital photos, applying both a feature-based model and a 
privacy-concerned convolutional neural network.  Techniques for feature engineering were 
explored with methods for utilizing metrics such as relative face size and head-pose estimation. 
The MLP model achieved the highest validation accuracy at 94.34%, which demonstrates 
generalizability and promise for future use in an anonymization system for smartphone users.  
The convolutional neural network also demonstrated promising results with the highest achieved 
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accuracy of 81.55% and limited overfitting of the training set.  This work is the first of its kind in 
being able to offer a fully privacy-concerned approach as all other works previously relied upon 
contextual information within a full image.  Additionally, we eliminate the need for any sort of 
manual cooperation between photographer and bystanders as most other related works require.  
The hope is that being able to offer a system that automates the protection of individuals in 
mobile photos and preserves the privacy of those captured, the user trust and willingness to use 
such a method in a real-world system is greatly enhanced over any previous methods which all 
require some form of participation on the bystanders' parts. 
Three fully automated approaches for face anonymization (black boxing, blurring, and 
face swapping) were presented for use with the classifying models.  To better understand user 
opinions around public photo privacy and each of the presented methods, a comprehensive user 
study was carried out.  Participant responses indicated that while privacy of photos and 
individuals in public settings was definitely a concern for most, developing anonymizing 
methods which do not harm photo quality is important for creating any sort of real-world system.  
Especially promising were the large number of positive responses on the blurring and swapping 
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3 – Sensor-Based Detection and Dynamic Mitigation of Visual Eavesdropping on Mobile 
Devices and Web Browsers 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
To address the growing problem of visual eavesdropping on smartphone screens in 
public, we propose the first, automated scheme for easily detecting visual eavesdroppers around 
a user's phone before a user accesses and potentially leaks sensitive app content.  Specifically, 
this work explores a sensor-based approach utilizing the integrated, front-facing cameras which 
come standard on most modern smartphones.  A state-of-the-art mobile face detection model is 
coupled with a magnetometer reading threshold to offer fast detection of eavesdroppers.  Based 
on attempted eavesdropping trials, this solution is capable of accurately detecting surrounding 
eavesdroppers before a user checks their desired app.  
Beyond detection, this work also explores the mitigation of visual eavesdropping to allow 
users to still access their desired apps or websites while protecting any sensitive content.  We 
first propose modifying existing applications to utilize user-interface-as-an-image (UIaaI) to 
enable various image processing and computer vision techniques to be applied to live app UIs.  
A YOLO style deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) is used to automatically detect 
sensitive content such as text messages in apps.  Additionally, a method for dynamically 
retraining the model on user-specified content is presented to ensure real-world usability. Finally, 
for web browser environments, we propose a novel HTML/CSS injection scheme to 
automatically introduce blurring for sensitive content on web pages.  This scheme is able to run 
over any web page without modification by the developers by running in a Google Chrome 
browser extension. 
Users can utilize this complete scheme in public locations by immediately scanning their 
surroundings without leaving their desired app.  In especially crowded scenarios, attackers 
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constantly walking behind or around the user that might avoid the scanning detection mode can 
be avoided with a manual activation of content hiding. However, the scanning mode should be 
sufficient in most public scenarios. Content hiding is then performed for the user while still 
allowing them to use their desired app. When a user feels they are in a safe location with no 
chance of shoulder surfing occurring, the content protection can be switched off manually at any 
time. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 3.2 provides an overview 
of related works. Chapter 3.3 describes the visual eavesdrop attack scenario in greater detail. 
Chapter 3.4 presents and details the sensor-based eavesdrop detection scheme. Chapter 3.5 
describes the concept of UIaaI and the methods for automated detection and hiding of sensitive 
content.  Chapter 3.6 describes the design and effectiveness of the web-based content hiding 
system.  Chapter 3.7 presents conclusions.  
3.2 – Related Work 
 The majority of work relating to shoulder surfing attacks have traditionally focused on 
protecting specific attack vectors such as phone passcode input. Kumar et al. [1] present a gaze-
based password entry method for preventing shoulder surfing attacks by utilizing a user's gaze 
rather than their hands to enter passcode digits. Chakraborty and Mondal [2] present a honeypot-
based scheme whereby if a shoulder surfer attempts to enter a credential containing a tag digit 
they would be detected. Yu et al. [3] propose an evolvable password protection scheme using 
images as keys rather than digit-based authentication. Zhang et al. [4] presented a similar 
evolving password scheme using augmented reality displays to present an input field that is only 
visible to a specific user.  Sun et al. [5] propose a graphical authentication scheme resistant to 
multiple camera screen spying attacks for passcode entry. This work attempts to prevent attacks 
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not only over specific scenarios but in the general case on any number of apps or services with a 
universal protection scheme. 
 Some works focus on detecting or preventing shoulder surfing attacks on specific non-
mobile platforms.  Watanabe et al. [6] developed a dummy cursor system for desktop or laptop 
platforms to hide the true cursor from attackers' views. Li et al. [7] present a shoulder surfing 
detection scheme for ATMs by tracking human bodies and faces.  This work primarily focuses 
on mobile and web platforms due to their ubiquitous and uniquely susceptible nature. 
 Other works of interest focus specifically on the detection and alerting of shoulder 
surfing attacks for mobile devices. Saad et al. [8] study several different methods for actually 
alerting mobile users such as through vibration or visual indication. Brudy et al. [9] explore 
various methods users can employ to be more aware and protective of their mobile displays.  
Lian et al. [10] propose a system for tracking eyes of individuals looking at mobile screens and 
dimming the screen in response to eavesdrop detection.  This work does not focus on methods 
for alerting users, rather content hiding is performed automatically.  Additionally, our work does 
not rely on any specific facial attribute such as eyes to detect eavesdropping. 
 Beyond novel detection methods, our work is also the first to offer private content hiding 
with little modification for mobile apps in the general case.  Existing approaches for content 
hiding require specific and time-consuming code changes for published applications.  Our 
approach offers automated content detection and hiding with minimal code changes for existing 
apps by utilizing UIaaI.  Detected private content can be automatically obfuscated with blurring 
or other hiding techniques whereas many existing methods require manual code changes specific 
to the type of private content such as password entry schemes. 
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3.3 – Mobile Attack Scenario 
In this work, we consider an attack scenario as any occasion where a mobile device user 
is located in a public space with other individuals.  In this environment, the attacking party could 
be any person near enough to the user to see the phone screen, but out of the user's field of view.  
This is because it is assumed that attackers within the vision of the user could be easily detected 
by a defensive user.  Attackers then are ideally located to the sides or behind the user where the 
device screen is visible and not obstructed by the user's body. This work aims to detect these 
cases where the user is uniquely vulnerable to being spied on. Fig. 12 provides a visual 
representation of a possible attack scenario. The attackers are featured behind and to the sides of 
the user in the blind spots highlighted in red. 
 
Figure 12: Visualization of a potential attack scenario. The vulnerable “danger areas” relative 










3.4 – Sensor-Based Eavesdropping Detection Scheme 
 
3.4.1 – Overview 
 In order to be effective, an eavesdropping detection system must be able to locate 
attackers in the user’s vulnerable blind spots where they cannot easily see.  Additionally, the 
detection system should ideally be unobtrusive to users and convenient to use.  To satisfy these 
requirements, we develop a scanning-based solution implemented as a mobile app which can be 
downloaded onto user phones. The scanning detection works by having a user quickly normalize 
the phone, and then, utilizing the front facing device camera, scanning the camera left and right.  
A magnetometer based binary thresholding method is used to eliminate the user's own 
appearance in any captured image frames.  Captured images are passed through a BlazeFace [11] 
based facial detection network.  If faces are captured after the thresholding process, there are 
potential attackers in the user's vulnerable fields who could view content on their phone screen. 
 The complete detection pipeline is outlined as follows: 
1. The user phone is normalized by being oriented with the front camera facing the user face 
with the user holding it. 
2. Attacker scanning is begun by the user holding a button in the mobile app. The user 
quickly scans the vulnerable areas around them with the front camera. 
3. Magnetometer binary thresholding is used to eliminate images which contain the user's 
own face. 
4. Remaining image frames are passed through the facial detection network. 





3.4.2 – Magnetometer Normalizing and Thresholding 
 
Implementation 
Most smartphones are equipped with a magnetometer sensor for reading information 
about local magnetic fields as well as the Earth's magnetic fields for general positional 
information.  We are able to utilize these types of sensors to compute the user's current 
orientation relative to magnetic north or, in other words, a compass heading for the user.  The 
magnetic heading information can then be used to filter out images where the front facing 
camera has not been turned far enough to avoid capturing the user's own face. 
Accessing the magnetic information on a smartphone differs across device platforms.  
iOS offers access to magnetometer sensor data through a CLLocationManager object.  The 
object is able to deliver heading updates through the locationManager(_:didUpdateHeading:) 
delegate function.  This allows real time updates for magnetic heading information. Android 
offers access to device magnetometers through use of a SensorManager object.  The 
getRotationMatrix(rotationMatrix, null, accelerometerReading, magnetometerReading) function 
call in conjunction with getOrientation(rotationMatrix, orientationAngles) call can be used to 
compute accurate heading information independent of device rotation using both the device 
accelerometer and magnetometer.  Either of these APIs enables accurate device orientation 
information. 
Use in Attacker Detection 
With magnetic orientation collected, it is possible to store device orientation, and monitor 
as the user rotates their device to scan around.  During the attacker detection phase, the user is 
presented with a UI button element to first normalize their device orientation.  The user must 
point their device with the front camera pointing directly at their face while holding the device in 
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front of them. After activating the button, the application stores the current heading information 
and begins scanning mode.  During scanning, the phone's current heading value is first checked.  
If the x-axis heading degree is +/- 15°, no image frame is captured.  This threshold generally 
prevents any image of the user's face from being captured but can be tuned to allow for users 
who hold their phones closer or further from their face.  Under this scheme, image frames which 
are captured and passed to the face detection network can be assumed to be free of the user's 
face. 
3.4.3 – Facial Detection Network 
In order to rapidly and accurately detect attackers around the user, a state-of-the-art facial 
detection network is employed.  We utilize a convolutional neural network based around the 
BlazeFace architecture optimized specifically for mobile GPUs.  The network architecture shown 
in Fig. 13 utilizes increasingly shrinking sizes of convolutional "blocks" which efficiently shrink 
the feature space to generate predictive bounding box information.  The network uses a 
combination of single convolutional blocks with double convolutional blocks.  The single blocks 
simply consist of a 5x5 kernel convolution, a 1x1 convolution, and a max pooling layer followed 
by an activation function.  The double blocks consist of two of these single blocks, but with only 
one max pooling layer.  In other words, max pooling is only performed once for each type of 
block. 
This style of convolutional neural network is highly desirable for the domain of attacker 
detection due to its relatively fast inference time on mobile processors and GPUs.  The model is 
capable of achieving 0.6 ms inference time on iPhone XS platforms which corresponds to faster 
than real time performance in forward pass detection.  Tested against MobileNetV2 [12], the 
network offers precision within 1% of MobileNet, but with significantly faster performance (0.6 
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ms compared with 2.1 ms).  Both bounding box information and facial anchor points are 
generated from the feature extraction network.  Fig. 14 shows example output from the network 
visualized over a sample image. 
 
Figure 13: Architecture of feature extraction portion of facial detection network 
 
 
This implemented network is capable of real time detection of attacker faces on most 
modern iOS and Android devices within front-facing camera image frames captured during the 
scanning mode of operation.  The network is robust against pose deviation in faces as well as 
distance. Taken together with the magnetometer-based thresholding technique presented in the 
previous section, the complete detection scheme is fully capable of robust attacker detection. 
Due to the lack of forward-pass prediction delay, a user attempting to quickly scan their 
surroundings in a discrete manner can be alerted immediately if a potential attacker is located 
behind or around them in their blind spots. 
Attacker detection results from the detection network are utilized to automatically censor 
content in apps to protect users until the scanning mode shows that there are no further attackers 
nearby.  In the following section, we present a novel technique for allowing existing mobile 





Figure 14: Example detected face with bounding box in green and facial anchor points plotted in 
red. Image source: https://unsplash.com/photos/FGaknWvNbBk 
 
 
3.5 – Automated Private Content Detection and Hiding 
3.5.1 – User Interface as an Image (UIaaI) 
Overview 
With modern mobile applications, there are often many complex layers of UI code to 
dynamically generate and present content to users in an accessible manner.  Because of this it 
may be difficult for many mobile app developers to add additional functionality for hiding 
private content dynamically.  This could present an enormous commitment of time for large 
mobile apps with complex and nested user interface elements where it may be difficult to 
identify which content is currently visible and needs to be hidden from visual eavesdroppers. 
To help mitigate this issue and provide a standardized methodology for dynamically 
hiding sensitive content on complex applications, we present UI as an Image.  The basic idea of 
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this concept is that computer vision techniques such as object detection and image filtering are 
highly applicable to the domain of private content detection and could replace tedious and time-
consuming code conversion of existing applications.  Under UIaaI, dynamically generated UI 
views are presented to the user entirely as a pre-rendered, interactive image rather than as direct 
views of the app UI.  This approach offers several benefits, namely the technique for converting 
applications to utilize UIaaI is standardized for all applications no matter the underlying UI 
complexity, computer vision techniques can be applied directly to existing views of UI without 
the need to directly program any content-hiding logic, and complex private content can be 
automatically identified.  Although utilizing images as displayed UI elements eliminates some 
interactivity, UIaaI can be used temporarily for situations where users are in public spaces.  Apps 
can easily be switched back to their default behavior once a user no longer has to worry about 
eavesdropping. 
Conversion Pipeline 
In order to make UIaaI as universally adoptable as possible, the pipeline for providing 
conversion in apps is simple.  An application on iOS or Android that needs to implement 
dynamic content protection can follow these general guidelines: 
1. Implement a switchable mode which a user can activate via a button or other UI 
element. 
2. Once a user has switched to UIaaI mode, the application should pre-render its 
current UI view as a single image frame. 
3. The pre-rendered UI view is displayed to the user on-screen. 
4. A pass of content detection is performed over the image to identify any content 
that should be hidden. 
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5. A Gaussian blurring filter is utilized to dynamically hide any sensitive content. 
6. Once a user has switched back to normal mode, the regular app display logic can 
be used again. 
 
Utilizing this general guideline, even highly complex app UIs will not require 
complicated UI logic to enable dynamic hiding of sensitive content.  The goal of this is to enable 
developers to easily make their applications shoulder surfing resistant and encourage adoption of 
content hiding to benefit end users.  Additionally, being able to operate on pre-rendered images 
enables a variety of interesting computer vision techniques to be applied over the UI such as 
content swapping to hide content from view with dummy content.  Most importantly, we propose 
that pre-rendered UI can be used to automatically detect private content with an object detection 
network. 
The drawback to this design is a slight loss in user-interactivity.  This is due to the fact 
that image-based views of complex UIs cannot directly emulate all of the visual actions that a 
traditional UI view is able to generate.  For example, although a user's touch events and 
coordinates of the touch can be recorded and translated into the activation of a button or other 
element, the normal visualization of a button being depressed would require an additional series 
of pre-rendered views to be generated.  Despite this, we maintain that for suitably large 
applications, the ease of enabling private content hiding through UIaaI outweighs this temporary 





3.5.2 – Private Content Detection Network 
Network Design 
 
In order to automate the detection of private content, we find that object detection 
networks such as YOLO [13] or EfficientDet [14], which have been used to great effect in fields 
of object tracking or generalized object detection, are uniquely useful in visually identifying user 
interface elements.  This is due primarily to the fact that user interface elements generally share 
very similar visual attributes.  For example, in an application which displays emails in an inbox, 
each email summary view will feature the same general attributes (a subject line, an icon 
representing whether the item has been read or not, and a brief excerpt from the email text).  
These similarities in visual appearance which are extremely common among UI elements should 
be learnable by an object detection network. 
We implement an object detection network based off the YOLOv5 [15] architecture.  
This type of network features high inference speed and smaller model size relative to other state 
of the art networks.  These features make it a prime candidate for inclusion onto mobile 
platforms.  Fig. 15 provides an overview of the implemented network architecture.  The network 
relies on a feature extraction backbone built around cross-stage-partial (CSP) network layers [16] 
along with a spatial pyramid pooling (SPP) layer [17] for getting feature tensors of fixed output 
size irrespective of input image size.  The feature aggregation or neck portion of the network is 
built around the path aggregation network (PANet) architecture [18] which has been used to 
great success in competing object detection networks.  The final output layers are output from 
different downsampled feature spaces in the network.  This is done to allow the network to 
identify spatially larger or smaller objects in an input image at different levels of granularity.  
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Resulting output vectors contain bounding box anchors, box width, box height, class prediction, 
and confidence interval information. 
 
Figure 15: Architectural overview of the private content detection network. 
 
Training for Sensitive Content Detection 
 In order to evaluate the content detection network's ability to detect and classify different 
types of common UI elements that would contain private content in the real world, a dataset for 
text messages in the iOS Messages app was created for training the network.  Text messages 
were selected as the UI element of choice in this case because they feature many visual 
similarities to other common private elements such as email summaries or phone call 
notifications.  Text messages also have the potential to be challenging for an object detection 
network due to the large variation in size across different messages. 
 The created dataset contains 188 rendered text message conversations.  The network was 
trained over 1000 epochs to determine how quickly it was able to converge.  The resulting model 
was able to achieve 98.17% mean average precision at 0.5 intersection over union (mAP@0.5).  
The model was able to achieve this performance after 450 epochs of training which corresponds 
to 14 minutes of training time on an Nvidia Tesla T4.  The results for this training are visualized 
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in Fig. 16 along with precision and recall metrics.  Sample test forward pass predictions are 
visualized in Fig. 17.  These results generally show that the model is highly capable of learning 
to distinguish UI elements even in a complex layout such as text message stacks. 
 
Figure 16: Bounding box mean average precision, precision, and recall metrics over progressive 
training epochs.  Note that charts are smoothed with original data shown as a shadow behind.  










Figure 17: Sample text detection output with confidence metric.  The network is capable of 
accurately detecting text messages of varying sizes and positions. 
 
3.5.3 – User-Defined Content Retraining 
We recognize that it is an impossible task to fully identify all forms of private content 
that a user might wish to be protected across many different mobile applications.  Users may 
have a financial app which displays a summary of account balances which they would not want 
strangers in public to see for example.  To this end, we propose a scheme for dynamic training 
sample generation.  Under this scheme, users can manually identify a UI element they wish to 
automatically detect and hide within an app, and many training image samples can be generated 
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of the same element using visual transformations.  Fig. 18 presents a visualization of all 
transformations/augmentations applied to sample text message images. 
Flip Transformation 
In order to simulate the different orientations that UI elements might take on a mobile 
phone, random horizontal and vertical flipping of pre-rendered views provides the model with 
variation in positioning that might be encountered in the wild as a user accesses their app. 
Rotation Transformation 
Similar to the flip transformation, the rotation transformation is proposed as a means to 
introduce more positional variation into a generated dataset.  Rotations in 90° intervals are used, 
as mobile UIs almost never feature non-right-angle rotations in the wild.  The rotations combined 
with flip transformations are found to offer a great deal of positional variety even for very small 
numbers of original training samples. 
Random Cropping and Tiling 
To simulate the fact that many complex mobile UIs stack or layer UI elements together in 
the same views, we utilize randomized image cropping and tiling.  This method is used to 
combine together different views of the same elements to force the model to learn to identify 
elements at any region of a pre-rendered UI view.  Complementary slices of training images are 
used to form a full-sized training sample. 
Training Results 
To validate the training data generation scheme, we utilize a subset of the original text 
message dataset with only 10 images.  These images were used to generate a new dataset of 150 
augmented images.  The same model architecture as presented in section 3.5.2 was trained over 
these generated images.  This model was able to nearly match the validation average precision of 
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the model trained on the full dataset, reaching a mAP@0.5 of 95.65%.  The level of accuracy 
demonstrates that it is possible to train a robust model for UI recognition with fewer training 
samples than are traditional required in object detection tasks.  This is attributed primarily to the 
similarity in lighting conditions, visual properties, and shape of most UI views which are rarely 
so similar for more generalized recognition tasks. 
 
Figure 18: Visualization of random transformations and augmentations applied over a subset of 







3.5.4 – Evaluation of Attacker Detection and Content Hiding Scheme 
 In order to evaluate the overall efficacy of our content protection scheme, we carry out a 
series of trials whereby an individual acting as an attacker attempts to glean some information 
from a user's screen.  The trials are intended to mimic conditions that average users might 
encounter in public locations.  The user is standing and holding their phone upright in front of 
them attempting to read a text conversation.  The attacker could be located anywhere within the 
user blind spots identified in Fig. 12.  Table 4 presents the results of these trials.  The attacker 
was made to either stand stationary or move around behind the user.  Even with both user and 
attacker moving, the detection network was able to identify an attacker in most scenarios.  The 
failure cases in the trials were when the attacker was able to move very quickly behind the user 
to evade the camera.  Because of the fast movement, the attacker appeared heavily blurred in 
captured images, and facial details were not defined enough for the detection network to identify 
a face.  However, we note that because the attacker had to be moving quickly, they had difficulty 
actually reading information off of the user phone, so information leakage was minimal.  The 
attacker was only ever able to glean 1-4 words from a text conversation. 
Table 4: Trial outcomes for each simulated visual eavesdrop attack.  Attacker position is relative 





3.6 – Browser Extension-Based Private Content Hiding 
 
3.6.1 – Chrome Extension Overview 
Beyond mobile devices and applications, users frequently access private services via web 
application.  Although these web services allow easy access to for users to perform actions like 
online banking or ordering goods from online stores, using these services in public on a laptop or 
other device can easily allow strangers to see personal information similar to mobile 
applications.  To address this issue and provide content protection for as many devices as 
possible, we develop a browser extension for dynamic content hiding. Because Chrome is one of 
the most popular web browsers with large amounts of support for 3rd party extensions, we 
develop an extension targeting the Chrome platform to reach a large population of web users. 
3.6.2 – Identifying Sensitive Content 
 Generalized private content detection is carried out primarily by searching for HTML 
patterns.  Specifically, four HTML structures are used for detecting sensitive personal data. 
• The HTML <form> elements that use POST as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)  
method. For any <form> that requires inputs of sensitive data such as passwords, the 
submitted data should not be exposed in the Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Thus, 
these forms must use POST as their HTTP methods. 
• The HTML <input> elements with types of password, telephone, or email addresses. 
Some input fields that require sensitive personal information are not wrapped up in a 
form, so they need to be searched for individually. 
• The HTML <iframe> elements. Some online payment pages enclose all input fields for 
private information (such as credit card number) in an <iframe>. Due to the same-origin 
policy, an iframe element cannot be accessed with different origins using JavaScript, 
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which makes it difficult to detect sensitive data among the internal HTML nodes. 
Therefore, this extension checks whether the allowpaymentrequest attribute of a captured 
<iframe> is set to true. If so, the <iframe> must contain input fields that ask for input of 
credit-card-related information. 
• Login buttons. Clicking these buttons changes the Document Object Model (DOM) tree. 
Sometimes, the change displays input fields for users to enter their usernames and 
passwords. 
 
3.6.3 – Performing Dynamic Content Detection 
There are two main cases where dynamic content detection is performed.  The first and 
most common is when a page is first loaded.  The content script of the Chrome extension sets the 
run_at field to document_idle indicating that either window.onload or DOMContentLoaded has 
been called.  In either case, there might still be scripts running as the event is triggered.  If a 
running script inserts any node into the DOM tree during this time, the new node will not be 
found when the content detection script is running and cannot be captured. 
To avoid this problem, the extension can call window.requestAnimationFrame which 
takes as an argument a callback function the browser calls whenever a page repaint occurs. This 
implementation catches all freshly inserted nodes in the DOM tree, but page repainting occurs 
often when a page is loaded to set up styling.  This can cause large performance impacts to a 
webpage. 
A better approach is to invoke the setTimeout function. The content detection and CSS 
style injection logic can be directly passed as a parameter callback to this function.  This process 
is less costly, in terms of performance, because the callback can be delayed a few milliseconds 
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before executing.  This generally allows for enough time for all web page elements to load 
before attempting to detect sensitive content. 
A final case where a content detection pass is performed is when any JavaScript event 
triggers a change in the DOM tree.  This could occur when a user interacts with an element on a 
web page which activates a log in field. To get around these interactive elements, a list of 
keywords is used: "login", "log in", "signin", "sign in", "sign up", "signup", "register", "join", 
"create new account", and "try it free". Any interactive element containing these keywords is 
attached with a click event listener to the element's event list. 
Finally, a manual toggle is provided to users to blur entire pages to deal with any other 
cases not covered by the extension. 
3.6.4 – Applying CSS Styles 
Once sensitive content has been detected on a web page, the extension applies Gaussian 
blurring effects to specific elements, so attackers will find it significantly more difficult to 
identify specific content like letters or numbers.  The following algorithm applies CSS styles to 
sensitive content: 
1. Apply styles to any captured HTML <form> elements that use POST methods.  
These could include forms such as payment information submissions. 
2. If email input fields are the only captured elements, CSS styles are applied to 
these and the associated submit buttons. Buttons are identified as closest in the 
DOM tree rooted at the parent node of the email address input field.  If no button 
is found, a recursive search of the parent tree is performed until one is found. 
3. If the discovered content contains HTML elements other than email address input 
fields, the CSS styles are simply applied to the entire page. This is because the 
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DOM tree could contain iframes, password fields, or telephone fields.  These 
categories of information are especially important to protect, and, in some cases, 
leaking the identity of the website could be risky. 
Fig. 19 displays an example web page with obfuscating styling applied. 
 
Figure 19: CSS blurring styles applied to the automatically detected Twitter sign up page. 
 
 
3.6.5 – Evaluation 
 The content protection extension is tested over a series of highly trafficked websites.  
Primary testing was done on login and signup pages, as these are the most common forms that 
can contain private information. Table 5 contains results for testing on each web page.  A pass 
indicates the extension correctly obfuscated private fields.  The misc column indicates if any 
additional testing was done on the website with content specific to that page.  Most websites 
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were successfully protected, with some failure cases. For att.com, the signup page routing is 
performed using JavaScript methods rather than loaded from a server. Thus, there was no 
detected page change by the extension.  For pandora.com, the web pages fail to be detected due 
to a similar problem caused by JavaScript-based page loading.  Pinterest and Quizlet 
obfuscations work correctly, but obfuscation styling is unable to be reverted due to difficulty in 
capturing login modal closing events.  Correcting these specific issues are avenues for future 
work. 
 




3.7 – Conclusion 
In this work, we presented multiple solutions for protecting private content on mobile 
device screens from visual eavesdroppers in public spaces.  A sensor-based eavesdrop detection 
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scheme was designed utilizing magnetometer and front-facing camera built in sensors for iOS 
and Android devices. The scheme was found to be effective in numerous trials with both a 
stationary and slow-moving attacker.  In addition to attacker detection, we proposed an 
automated solution for detecting private UI elements through a YOLO style deep convolutional 
neural network which was able to achieve 98.17% mAP@0.5.  To allow users to retrain the 
network to recognize custom identified content, we presented a series of training image 
transformations which allow for generation of new sample images from a small existing set. To 
protect content on web services, we proposed a Chrome browser extension which is capable of 
automatically detecting and applying blurring to web page fields that could contain private user 
information.  We evaluated this extension on multiple high-traffic websites and found that the 
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4 – Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This thesis addresses the growing privacy and security challenges posed by the growing 
proliferation of smartphones and mobile devices in public spaces.  Two important privacy 
challenges were identified as posing a significant threat to users: the growth of digital 
photography in public spaces by smartphone users and the increasing potential for visual 
eavesdrop attacks on unknowing users who increasingly use mobile devices to access 
applications which can display sensitive data.  Statistical studies and sources were presented to 
establish these growing problems.  Each of these problems were addressed by this thesis. 
 Chapter 2 presented an automated solution for conveniently protecting the privacy of 
bystanders in digital photography.  A feature-based approach was explored with feature 
engineering steps to produce local blurring, relative face size, gaze deviation, and deviation of 
face from center metrics were created to capture the ways humans identify bystanders in an 
image.  To further preserve user privacy, a convolutional neural network model was introduced 
to utilize only local face images, so that users might not have to provide entire images for 
subject/bystander detection.  Beyond identifying bystanders, several methods for protecting face 
images were explored including blurring, black boxing, and face swapping.  Through a 
comprehensive user study, it was found that users generally found the privacy impacts of public 
photography concerning and favored blurring as a method for protecting faces. 
 Chapter 3 presented an attacker detection scheme for mobile device users with integrated 
cameras and magnetometer sensors to quickly detect individuals around them who might 
shoulder surf or eavesdrop their screen.  A binary thresholding mechanism using magnetic 
heading coupled with a deep, convolutional facial detection network allows users to easily scan 
their blind spots and surroundings without seeming conspicuous.  To automate detection of 
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private content displayed in applications, UIaaI is presented as a means to pre-render UI views 
and avoid substantial code-base changes for developers.  A deep object detection network was 
implemented and evaluated for detecting challenging UI elements such as text messages.  
Finally, a web browser extension was developed to automatically detect and obscure private 
content on web applications to handle cases where users must use web services to access or enter 
important information. 
Due to the lack of available image datasets for the target/bystander detection application, 
collecting usable images including a good diversity of photo types, locations, lighting, etc. was a 
time-consuming process that could hardly be fully automated as photos had to be manually 
reviewed for suitability. The induced small size of the dataset might limit the generality of the 
results. In the future, this dataset will be expanded on to greatly increase the number of images 
and faces included.  The goal of this is to ensure that models trained over the expanded dataset 
will be able to better generalize to in-the-wild photos.  Making the dataset publicly available will 
allow other researchers to contribute and refine the images as well.  Additionally, a more 
significant user study with a larger population will be carried out in the future to examine the 
usability of our system in greater detail. 
Because the eavesdropping attacker detection scheme was unable to identify attackers 
that were moving at a fast speed, we identify this as a possible future improvement that could be 
made to further protect users.  Some methods for deblurring or sharpening facial features will be 
explored to enhance the face detection network's ability in the future.  Additionally, the content 
hiding browser extension was unable to correctly detect private fields in all tested websites.  One 
of the main causes for this was the use of JavaScript functions to load new pages rather than 
perform HTTP requests.  This can make it difficult to always detect the HTML login elements, 
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as they are encapsulated in a span and link tag.  In the future, we hope to improve the detection 
logic to handle cases such as these. 
 
